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Government and Policy

Rogue Public Officials Can Be Forced to Pay for Their Own Abuse

BY Steve Biko Wafula · July 5, 2026 11:07 am

Kenya has lived with one of the most offensive forms of public-sector impunity for far too long. A government official abuses power, violates the Constitution, ruins a citizen’s life, loses the case in court—and then walks away while the taxpayer settles the bill.

The official keeps the salary. The official keeps the pension. The official keeps the title, the connections and, in many cases, the confidence to repeat the same misconduct. The victim receives compensation from public funds, but the person who caused the harm feels no direct financial consequence.

That arrangement has never been justice. It has been impunity financed by the very people who suffered under it.

A landmark Court of Appeal judgment has now delivered a warning that should be framed and placed in every police station, ministry, county office, regulatory agency and administrator’s office in Kenya: public office is not a financial shield for personal wrongdoing.

In Mosigisi v Ole Kimeiwa & 8 others, Civil Appeal E030 of 2020, reported as [2026] KECA 577 (KLR), the Court of Appeal upheld a decision exposing a former District Commissioner to personal liability arising from malicious and unconstitutional conduct. The judgment was delivered on March 17, 2026.

“A public office is not an insurance policy for wrongdoing. When power is abused for an unlawful or malicious purpose, the person behind the decision may have to answer with more than an official apology.”

The dispute arose after six citizens were arrested, prosecuted and later acquitted in a case connected to allegations of hindering the burial of a body. They went to court arguing that the prosecution had been malicious and that their constitutional rights had been violated.

The High Court agreed. It awarded each of the six petitioners KSh 800,000 in general damages—KSh 4.8 million in total, before interest and costs—and rejected the argument that the public official could automatically escape personal liability merely because he had acted while holding government office.

The Court of Appeal upheld that position. Its message was simple but profound: an official who steps outside lawful authority, acts maliciously or weaponises public power for an improper purpose cannot casually hide behind the State and send the bill to ordinary Kenyans.

This does not mean that every public servant who makes a mistake will automatically be forced to pay damages personally. The law still protects officials who act lawfully, honestly, in good faith and within the proper scope of their duties. Government cannot function if every officer is terrified that a reasonable decision made in good faith will destroy their family financially.

But good-faith protection is not a licence for cruelty. It is not immunity for malice. It is not permission to arrest people without lawful cause, engineer prosecutions, disobey court orders, seize property, manipulate procurement, frustrate citizens or use public authority to settle private scores.

The distinction is critical. A public officer performing a lawful duty deserves institutional protection. A public officer who converts State power into a personal weapon is, in the language long used in the law of torts, on a frolic of his or her own.

For the taxpayer, this ruling confronts a deep economic injustice. When the State compensates a victim using public money, the taxpayer pays twice. The citizen first pays to finance the office, vehicle, salary, security, investigation, prosecution and legal defence of the official. The citizen then pays again when a court awards damages for the official’s unlawful conduct.

That is not merely wasteful. It creates moral hazard. It teaches officials that the benefits of abusing power are personal while the costs are public. It separates decision-making from consequence. It rewards recklessness because the person taking the risk is not the person expected to pay when that risk becomes a constitutional violation.

Personal liability reconnects power with consequence.

When officials understand that an unlawful order, malicious arrest, fabricated case, illegal demolition, corrupt administrative decision or deliberate violation of rights may reach their own bank accounts and property, the quality of public decision-making changes. Files are read more carefully. Legal advice is taken more seriously. Reasons are recorded. Orders are questioned. Citizens are treated less like obstacles and more like rights-bearing human beings.

This is what constitutional government is supposed to mean. Article 10 demands the rule of law, accountability, integrity and transparency. Article 73 treats public authority as a public trust. Article 232 requires professional ethics, accountability and responsive service. Article 236 protects public officers from victimisation for lawful performance of their duties; it was never designed to sanitise deliberate illegality.

The ruling therefore does more than resolve one dispute. It strengthens the constitutional idea that an office does not absorb the personal wrongdoing of its holder. A title may confer power, but it does not erase responsibility.

The implications are significant for police commanders, chiefs, county officials, procurement officers, regulators, accounting officers, inspectors, commissioners and senior administrators. Whenever an official is accused of personally directing unlawful conduct, courts may examine whether that person was genuinely performing a lawful public duty or merely using public machinery to execute an improper agenda.

Victims and their advocates must, however, plead such cases carefully. Personal liability should not be assumed or thrown around as a slogan. The specific official must be properly identified, the unlawful acts attributed to that person must be set out, and evidence of malice, bad faith, abuse of office or action outside lawful a